ABSTRACT With the development of smart healthcare services, there is a growing demand for healthcare environments in which a patient can be collaboratively treated by multiple healthcare providers. To enable such collaborative treatments, it is essential to have a collaborative eHealth system that is capable of storing and managing large-scale health data generated by multiple healthcare providers as well as patients themselves in one place. However, this system may raise serious privacy concerns because of unauthorized access to sensitive health data of a data owner by other users. Usually, such privacy concerns can be resolved using attribute-based encryption (ABE), which provides fine-grained data access control mechanisms. Through ABE, in which access control is expressed by a set of attributes, the sensitive data of a data owner can be selectively shared with a set of data users by encrypting it with a set of attributes. However, with the growing popularity of smart healthcare services, which are enabled by analyzing large-scale health data collected from diverse populations, a binary access control policy akin to this is not sufficient for supporting the ever-growing request for sharing health data. Hence, in this paper, we develop a novel collaborative eHealth system that supports Multilevel Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing, MPPDS. In MPPDS, a data owner is able to share his or her health data with various data users within a collaborative eHealth system, under different levels of privacy protections. Specifically, our approach leverages local differential privacy to preserve the privacy of data owners in the process of data sharing and relies on ABE to support multilevel privacy guarantee mechanisms depending on the degree of trust between data owners and data users. We also present a method to effectively estimate aggregate statistics based on the collection of health data shared by different data owners under MPPDS. Experimental results with real and synthetic data sets demonstrate that the proposed MPPDS scheme enables more trusted data users to compute more accurate aggregate statistics than less trusted data users in a collaborative eHealth system.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid onset of an aging society and the rise in income levels, there has been a growing interest in personal health and well-being, which in turn has affected the healthcare service industry. Traditional healthcare services are treatment-oriented, focusing on healthcare services provided to patients in hospitals. That is, if a person is sick or has an abnormal health condition, he or she visits a hospital to receive treatment services. In recent years, however, due to the development of information and communications technologies (ICT), healthcare services are gradually changing from treatment-oriented to disease prevention and health
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promotion-oriented services. Along with the development of ICT technologies, a smart healthcare service, focusing on disease prevention and health promotion by continuously monitoring the health of users and providing a customized real-time service, is receiving significant attention.
Recent advancements in the area of sensors and emerging technologies in the area of large-scale data processing and analysis are key factors for enabling smart healthcare services. The development of sensor technology makes it possible to easily monitor the health status and daily activities of individuals in real time. For example, wearable devices, such as smartwatches and fitness bands which measure heart rate, electrocardiogram, and physical activities such as walking or cycling, have already been commercialized by various companies. Additionally, implantable sensors, which can be embedded within the human body, are currently being used to precisely monitor the state of body parts. Over the last decade, extensive effort has been invested in developing technologies that provide customized medical services to individuals by collecting and analyzing a large volume of personal health data. Consequently, many hospitals are currently adopting intelligent systems that are capable of recommending the most effective treatment procedures to doctors based on the knowledge obtained through the analysis of vast amounts of the medical data of patients. With the development of a smart healthcare industry, there is a growing demand for healthcare environments in which a patient can be collaboratively treated by multiple healthcare providers. To enable such treatments, it is essential to have a collaborative eHealth system, capable of storing and managing large-scale health data generated by multiple healthcare providers as well as patients themselves in one place, such as a third-party cloud [1] . In a collaborative eHealth system, each patient can share his or her sensitive health data with a wide variety of data users, including healthcare providers, insurance companies, and family members. For example, Figure 1 illustrates an instance of a collaborative eHealth system. In this scenario, we consider a patient, PA 1 , who is being collaboratively treated by two different hospitals, HP 1 (for hypertension) and HP 2 (for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease). The patient PA 1 provides access to the medical records generated by a doctor in Hospital HP 2 (HP 1 ) to a doctor in Hospital HP 1 (HP 2 ), who is responsible for his or her treatment. Furthermore, the patient uploads his or her health data, such as heart rate, blood pressure, and weight, collected by wearable health devices on a daily basis to the system and provides their access to doctors in HP 1 or HP 2 , who are in charge of treating him or her.
While such a collaborative eHealth system provides a convenient way to share the data of a patient amongst a wide range of healthcare parties, there always exist security and privacy risks in which unauthorized data users may access the sensitive health data of a patient. Usually, such privacy concerns can be resolved by attribute-based encryption (ABE), which provides fine-grained data access control mechanisms. Through ABE in which access control is expressed by a set of attributes, sensitive data of patients can be selectively shared with a set of data users by encrypting them with a set of attributes. Because ABE provides a promising solution to security and privacy issues in the area of collaborative eHealth systems, related technologies have been actively studied over the last decade [2] - [10] .
In a collaborative eHealth system based on ABE, if a set of attributes satisfies the access policy, the data user can decrypt the encrypted data, and thus obtain the true health data of a data owner. Otherwise, access is not granted to it. With the growing popularity of smart healthcare services enabled by analyzing large-scale health data collected from diverse populations, a binary access control policy akin to this is not sufficient for supporting the ever-growing request for sharing health data. For example, let us consider a motivating scenario in Figure 1 .
• Two health insurance companies, IC 1 and IC 2 , wish to leverage the knowledge obtained by analyzing largescale health data to develop new insurance products. In this scenario, the patient, PA 1 , grants his or her insurance company, IC 1 , access to his or her health data in exchange for a small compensation, such as insurance price discounts, if a certain level of privacy protection is guaranteed. In addition, he or she may provide the other insurance company, IC 2 , which he or she is not currently with, access to his or her health data, if a stronger level of privacy protection than that for IC 1 is ensured.
• Furthermore, the patient, PA 1 , may agree to provide access to his or her health data to the mobile healthcare service provider, MH 1 , which collects large-scale personal health data and uses the knowledge obtained from analyzing such data to improve smart healthcare services, if it guarantees a stronger level of privacy protection than those for IC 1 and IC 2 . Existing collaborative eHealth systems based on ABE cannot support such diverse health data sharing requests from various healthcare parties. Hence, in this paper, we develop a novel collaborative eHealth system which supports Multilevel Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing, MPPDS. In MPPDS, data owners are able to share their health data with various data users under different levels of privacy protections within a collaborative eHealth system. Particularly, the contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We first propose a novel collaborative eHealth system in which data owners (e.g., patients) share their sensitive health data with diverse data users (e.g., health insurance companies, health research organizations, healthcare institutions, etc.) under different levels of privacy protections. Specifically, our approach leverages local differential privacy (LDP) to preserve the privacy of data owners in the process of data sharing. Furthermore, the VOLUME 7, 2019 proposed approach relies on ABE to enable multilevel privacy protection mechanisms depending on the trust level between data owners and data users.
• Additionally, we present an effective method to estimate aggregate statistics based on the collection of health data shared by different data owners under MPPDS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work addressing an integration of ABE and LDP for collaborative eHealth systems to support multilevel privacy-preserving data sharing, depending on the trust level between data owners and data users. We also note that our approach is similar to the existing methods [11] - [13] , which support privacy-preserving data access in the health application area, in that ABE is used to support fine-grained data access control mechanisms. However, unlike the existing methods in which authorized data users can access the exact private data of data owners, in MPPDS, it is guaranteed that the exact private data of data owners are not exposed to even authorized data users (who can still infer aggregate statistics) by using LDP.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we provide background information. Section III proposes a novel collaborative eHealth system, which supports MPPDS. In Section IV, we experimentally evaluate the proposed approach using real and synthetic data sets. In Section V, we present related work not already covered in the paper, and the conclusion and future work are presented in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND A. LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy (DP) was originally intended for the datasharing purpose [14] , [15] . A trusted data curator has access to all the data, collected from each data owner. DP can be used for two different data sharing scenarios. First, the data curator releases either a statistical summary or synthetic data for public use [16] - [18] . In the second scenario, the data curator receives a query from a data user, adds random noise to the true result of the user query, and returns the noised result to the data user [19] - [21] .
LDP is a state-of-the-art approach that is used to protect individual privacy during the process of data collection. Unlike DP, LDP does not require the existence of a trusted data curator. In LDP, each data owner, who does not fully trust a data collector, adds carefully designed noises to his or her true data and reports noisy data to the data collector. LDP is formally defined as follows: A randomized algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy, if and only if for (1) all pairs of data owner's data d i and d j , and (2) any output O of A, the following equation holds [22] :
The above equation denotes that regardless of the data that the data collector receives from the data owner, the collector is not possible to speculate with high confidence whether the owner has sent d i or d j . The privacy budget, , controls the level of privacy such that smaller values of enforce stronger privacy protection, adding larger noises to the true data, while larger values of provide weaker privacy protection, adding smaller noises to the true data.
Randomized response (RR), used for many recent LDP algorithms, is the simplest method for achieving LDP. Let assume that the data owner's data, S, is represented as a bit string of length n (i.e., S ∈ {0, 1} n ). Let S[i] denote the i-th bit of the bit string S. Then, the data owner's original S is perturbed by using RR as following:
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Here, f ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter which controls the level of privacy. That is, a larger value of f enforces stronger privacy protection, adding a larger random noise to the original data.
On the contrary, a smaller value of f provides weaker privacy protection, adding a smaller random noise to the original data.
The above mechanism satisfies -differential privacy where
0.5f ) [22] . The data owner reports the noisy data, S , to the data collector, instead of sending the original data, S. Thus, it is guaranteed that the original data of the data owner is not exposed to the outside, but still, the data collector is able to infer aggregate statistics based on the noisy data set collected under LDP, if sufficient data are collected from various data owners. Based on the LDP definition above, the data collector who received the noisy data S cannot distinguish whether the true value of S is S or another bit string other than S with high confidence. This provides plausible deniability to the data owner. Furthermore, the possibility that an attacker, who can intercept the perturbed data S , can learn about the true data S from the perturbed data S is limited by the privacy budget .
LDP follows the sequential composition property of DP. That is, given an available privacy budget , the data owner can partition it into w smaller privacy budgets, 1 , 2 , · · · , w , such that = w i=1 i and use each smaller privacy budget to report her local data to a data collector.
B. ATTRIBUTE BASED ENCRYPTION
ABE is a one-to-many cryptographic technique used to achieve fine-grained and decentralized access control to encrypted data in clouds. Primarily, there are two categories of ABE, i.e., key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [2] , [3] and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [4] .
In KP-ABE, the ciphertexts are labeled with descriptive attributes by the encryptor, while the users' keys that possess access policies (access structures) are issued by a trusted authority. The policies specify what kind of ciphertexts that the user can access and decrypt. A typical application of KP-ABE is in targeted broadcasts (e.g., pay-per-view channels). The syntax for KP-ABE is summarized as follows: the public parameters pp, the ciphertext CT and the user's secret key sk associated with access structure τ as inputs. It reproduces the message M if A ∈ τ . In KP-ABE, the private key is associated with access structure τ and the ciphertext is associated with attribute set A. The decryption is successful if A satisfies the access structure τ .
In CP-ABE, the ciphertext is associated with access policies and users' keys are associated with a set of attributes. This permits the encryptor to specify the kind of users to have access to the ciphertext by stating access policies which are represented as access structures over a set of attributes. If a user possesses the required attributes to satisfy the access structure, he or she successfully decrypts the ciphertext. Otherwise, the decryption fails. CP-ABE is widely used in the provision of access control in cloud-based applications. The syntax for CP-ABE is summarized as follows:
CP-ABE Syntax: LetĀ = A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n be an attribute universe, A x denotes an attribute and n is the total number of attributes. The CP-ABE consists of the following algorithms.
1) Setup(1 λ ): This algorithm takes the security parameter λ as an input and produces the public parameters pp and the master key mk. 2) KeyGen(mk, A): This algorithm takes as input the master key mk and an attribute set A to produce a set of secret keys sk for every user that possesses the attribute set.
3) Encrypt(pp, M , τ ):
The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters pp, the access structure over a set of attributes τ and the message m ∈ (0, 1) * . It outputs a ciphertext CT decryptable by a user whose set of attributes can satisfy the access structure τ .
4) Decrypt(pp, CT , sk):
The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters pp, ciphertext CT and the secret key sk associated with an attribute set. If the set of attributes A associated with the secret key satisfy the access structure τ , the message M can be reproduced, otherwise the decryption is unsuccessful.
III. PROPOSED MPPDS SCHEME IN A COLLABORATIVE eHEALTH SYSTEM
The main objective of this research is to develop a novel collaborative eHealth system supporting MPPDS that enables a data owner to share sensitive health data with different data users under different levels of privacy protection. That is, the more (less) trusted a data user is, the less (more) noisy is a copy of the true data that he or she can access under a weaker (stronger) privacy protection. The key idea of the proposed approach is to integrate LDP, which preserves the privacy of data owners in the process of data sharing, and ABE, which supports fine-grained privacy protection mechanisms. For example, in Figure 2 , let us focus on a scenario in which a data owner, o i , wants to share his/her health data, d i , with two data users, u 1 and u 2 . Here, we assume that the trust level between o i and u 2 is higher than that between o i and u 1 . 1) Given a health data d i of the data owner o i , the proposed method first generates two perturbed copies, pd 1 i and pd 2 i , under LDP (Subsection III-B). 2) We rely on CP-ABE to provide a mechanism that the data user u 2 is able to have access to the two perturbed copies, pd 1 i and pd 2 i , while the data user u 1 can only access to pd 1 i (Subsection III-C). 3) With EM-based estimation of LDP, the data user u 2 (who can access to the two perturbed copies) is able to infer more accurately the original data (i.e., d i ) than the data user u 1 (who can only access to the one perturbed copy) (Subsection III-D). We now explain and describe each of these steps in detail.
A. PRELIMINARY
In this subsection, we formally introduce and define key terminologies we will rely on when describing the approach proposed in this paper.
1) DATA OWNER AND HEALTH DATA
Let O = {o 1 , o 2 , · · · , o w } be the set of data owners (e.g., patients). Here, w corresponds to the total number of data owners. Let d i be the health data of the i-th data owner, o i . In this paper, we focus on the data represented by a bit string of length n with exactly one bit set to 1 and others set to 0. Table 1 shows an example of health data representation for the average daily heart rate.
2) PRIVACY PROTECTION (OR TRUST) LEVEL
As stated earlier, in LDP, the privacy budget, , controls the level of privacy such that smaller values of enforce a stronger privacy guarantee, while larger values of provide a weaker privacy guarantee. Thus, in the proposed collaborative eHealth system, the privacy protection level is represented based on the values of the privacy budget that are used to perturb the true health data of the data owner by LDP. Given the total privacy budget, , let us assume that E = { 1 , 2 , · · · t } be a set of different privacy protection levels such that 1 < 2 < · · · < t = . That is, the privacy protection level of 1 enforces the strongest privacy VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. The proposed collaborative eHealth system supporting MPPDS: Given a privacy budget, , of LDP, a data owner (o i ) can share his or her sensitive health data (d i ) with different data users (u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u t ) under different levels of privacy protection. guarantees, adding larger noises to the true data. On the contrary, the privacy protection level of t (= ) provides a weaker privacy guarantee, adding smaller noises to the true data.
As the privacy protection level is dependent on the degree of trust between a data owner and a data user, the privacy protection level and the trust level are used interchangeably in this paper. That is, the trust level of 1 ( t ), which corresponds to the lowest (highest) trust level between a data owner and a data user, enforces the strongest (weakest) privacy guarantees.
3) DATA USER
Given the i-th data owner, let U = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u t } be the set of data users with whom the data owner, o i , shares his or her sensitive health data. Without loss of generality, we assume that the number of data users in U equals to t (which corresponds to the number of privacy protection levels). For an easy explanation, in this paper, we assume that the data owner, o i , shares his or her sensitive health data, d i , with the data user, u h ∈ U , under the privacy protection level of h ∈ E (where 1 ≤ h ≤ t). That is, the most trusted data user, u t , can access the least perturbed version of the true data under the privacy protection level of t that corresponds to the weakest one. In contrast, the least trusted data user, u 1 , can access the most perturbed version of the true data under the privacy protection level of 1 that is the strongest one.
4) AGGREGATE STATISTICS
For ease of illustration, in this paper we consider the scenario in which each data owner, o i ∈ O, shares his or her health data, d i , with a data user, u h , under the privacy level of e h ∈ E. Then, based on the perturbed data set shared by w different data owners, the data user, u h , wants to infer aggregate statistics. Formally, given w data sets,
we focus on the scenario in which the data user, u h , wants to compute P(v k ) for each k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ n, which denotes the probabilities of observing v k among w data sets,
Here, v k corresponds to a bit string of length n with the bit in position k set to 1 and others set to 0. For example, as shown in Table 1 , v 1 and v 2 correspond to 1000 and 0100, respectively. Then, obviously 1≤k≤n P(v k ) = 1.
B. ADDING RANDOM NOISE TO ORIGINAL DATA USING LDP
Before uploading health data that will be shared with data users under multilevel privacy guarantees, a data owner first needs to perturb it under -LDP. Given a health data, d i , the straightforward solution is to make the data owner, o i , to generate t perturbed copies, pd 1 i , pd 2 i , · · · , pd t i , by consuming privacy budget 1 , 2 , · · · t respectively, and then to allow the data user, u h (whose corresponding privacy protection level with the data user o i is h ), to access only the perturbed copy pd h i (where 1 ≤ h ≤ t). However, this scheme does not satisfy -LDP, because by the sequential composition property of LDP, the total privacy budget consumed during this process exceeds what is allowed (i.e., This leads to a serious privacy leakage, because a malicious data user, who may obtain multiple perturbed copies of the same data through various means, is able to infer more accurately the original data of a data owner than what is allowed under -LDP. Thus, in this paper, we present a method that enables MPPDS in a collaborative eHealth system, while satisfying -LDP.
Given two consecutive privacy protection levels, h−1 ,
h ∈ E, the gap between these two privacy levels, δ h , is defined as follows:
Let us further assume pd h i to be the perturbed version of the true data (i.e., d i ) that is obtained by RR with the privacy budget of δ h as explained in Subsection II-A. Then, as shown in Figure 2 , the data owner, o i , generates t perturbed copies of the same data,
, by using the same number of different privacy budgets, δ 1 , δ 2 , · · · , δ t , respectively. We note that this scheme satisfies -LDP, because by the sequential composition property, the privacy budget consumed during this process equals to the available total privacy budget (i.e., ( t h=1 δ h ) = t = ), guaranteeing that even malicious data users, who have access to all perturbed copies of the same data, could not infer the original data of the data owner more than what is allowed under -LDP.
However, this data perturbation scheme demands a mechanism that enables the data user to access multiple perturbed copies and to infer the original data of the data owner with the joint information. For example, let us consider the data user, u h , whose corresponding privacy protection level with the data user o i is h . In that case, since h = δ 1 +δ 2 +· · ·+δ h , the data user, u h , should access multiple perturbed copies,
, and reconstruct the original data with the joint information of them (which will be described in detail in the next two subsections).
C. SHARING OF NOISY DATA USING ABE
In this phase, we adopt the CP-ABE technique in [23] to regulate access to the perturbed data copies. After the perturbation process, attributes that a data user, u h , has to possess to access the perturbed data copies of the data owner, o i , are defined. Amongst these attributes is a trust-level attribute. In this work, we assume that the trust-level attribute can contain multiple values, i.e., from the least trust-level in the system to the actual data user's trust-level. For example, the data user, u h , with the actual trust-level h can have multiple values assigned to his/her trust-level attribute as { 1 , 2 , · · · , h } 1 < 2 <···< h by the trusted authority. The goal is to enable the data user to access multiple copies of the perturbed data as stated earlier. For instance, the above data user, u h , can access multiple perturbed data copies, pd 1 i , pd 2 i , · · · , pd h i . To achieve this, access policies for accessing the perturbed data copies by targeted data users are defined for encryption. In this work, the trust-level attribute is included in the constructed access policies. In general terms, the representation of the access policies in the form of an access structure is explained below.
Access Structure: Let τ represent an access structure used to enforce an access policy. The non-leaf nodes of τ denote threshold gates. Let nc x represent the number of children of a node x, and k x denote the threshold value of node x (where 0 ≤ k x ≤ nc x ). If k x = 1, it is an OR gate, while if k x = nc x , it is an AND gate. A x represents an attribute associated with a leaf node. The children of a node are numbered from 1 to nc and index(x) function returns the number. In this case, since, the trust-level attribute has multiple values, some nodes in the access tree are designated as translating nodes whose role is to translate attributes in the inner set of the attribute set into attributes in the outer set.
Let τ x denote the subtree of τ at a node x. For a set of attributes A to satisfy τ x (represented as τ x (A) = 1), the following are recursively evaluated:
• In the absence of translating nodes, if the node x is a nonleaf node, compute τ x for all x children of node x and τ x (A) returns 1 if at least one of the children returns 1.
• In the presence of a translating node, if the node x is a non-leaf node, compute τ x for all x children of node x and τ x (A) returns 1 if at least one of the children returns 1 or it returns a non-empty set (S x ) for the inner set of the attribute set.
• If x is a leaf node, 1 is returned iff A x ∈ A, i.e., if the attribute represented by the node x is present in the access structure. The access control mechanism proceeds through setup, key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms as follows.
Let G and G T be bilinear groups of prime order p, g be a group generator of G, and e : G×G → G T be a bilinear map. Let H : {0, 1} * be a hash function to map attributes to G.
1) SETUP ALGORITHM
This algorithm is run by a trusted authority. First, the bilinear group G of prime order p and with generator g is chosen. Then, α, β 1 and β 2 are randomly chosen from Z * p . The algorithm outputs the public parameters, pp, as (G, g, h 1 = g β 1 , h 2 = g β 2 , e(g, g) α ) and a master key, mk, as (g α , β 1 , β 2 ).
2) KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM
For each data user u h , a set of keys associated with his or her attributes are generated. For generality, let us consider a set of attributes A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m }, where a 0 denotes individual attributes in the outer set and a 1 , . . . , a m are the inner attribute sets (a i ) and a i,j denotes an attribute j in the inner set i.
The algorithm takes the master key mk, a set of data user attributes A and a data user index u h as inputs and produces a set of secret attribute keys sk. First, r {u h } ∈ Z * p is chosen randomly for each data user, then, r
∈ Z * p is used for a 0 attributes and then it chooses r
-is the number of attributes VOLUME 7, 2019 in set a i ) to produce sk for the data user as follows:
) ,
This algorithm is performed on all the perturbed data copies,
The algorithm takes as input the public parameters pp, a copy of the perturbed data pd h i and an access structure τ over attribute universe to produce an encrypted copy of pd h i as epd h i . A polynomial q x that is associated with each node in the access tree τ is chosen. The polynomials are chosen starting from the root node and proceed down to the leaf nodes. The degree of the polynomials at each node is set one less than the threshold value k x at that node, i.e., D x = k x − 1. s ∈ Z * p is chosen randomly and q R (0) = s is set for the root node R. Then D R other points are set randomly to define the polynomial q R completely. For another node x, q x (0) = q parent (index(x)) is set and D x other points are chosen randomly to completely define q x .
Let Y represent set of leaf nodes and X represent the translating nodes in the access structure. Note that the translating node translates { 1 , 2 , · · · , h } from the inner set into the outer attribute set. Encrypting a copy of the perturbed data pd h i under access structure τ to produce a ciphertext CT proceeds as follows;
Note that, in this case, CT corresponds to epd h i in Figure 2 . As shown in Figure 2 , this phase is done for all the perturbed data copies,
i , which are then outsourced to the cloud.
4) DECRYPTION ALGORITHM
CT , sk and A are fed as inputs into the Decryption (CT , sk, A) algorithm for recovering the original pd h i . Before the actual decryption, the data user has to prove her identity by satisfying the set of attributes specified in the access structure. If a node x of τ is a leaf node and a i,j / ∈ a i , a i ∈ A, the Decryption(CT , sk, A) produces ⊥. Otherwise, the algorithm produces an element of G as:
If the node x is a non-leaf node of τ and belongs to the outer set a 0 of τ , for all nodes z that are children of node x, call the Decryption(CT , sk, A) algorithm on each of them and store the result in F z . But, if the node x is a non-leaf node of τ and belongs to an inner set a i of τ , for all nodes z that are children of node x, call the Decryption(CT , sk, A) algorithm on each of them and store the result in F z . Then F z is translated to F z as follows:
).e(g, g)
Then F x for the node x is computed using Lagrange interpolation as:
where, S x is k x sized set of z nodes, i = index(z) and S x = index(z) : z ∈ S x . Otherwise ⊥ is produces if the node x is not satisfied.
The final stage of decryption begins by calling the Decryption algorithm on the root node R of the access tree τ . If the tree is satisfied by A, we set A = e(g, g) r {u h } s and decrypt the ciphertext as:
This is performed for all the encrypted perturbed data copies epd 1 i , epd 2 i , · · · , epd h i to reproduce the original copies pd 1 i , pd 2 i , · · · , pd h i which are then passed to the next stage Through the usage of inner sets within an attribute set of the data user, u h , multiple values can be assigned to the trust-level attribute and hence, the user's ability to recover the multiple perturbed data copies pd 1 i , pd 2 i , · · · , pd h i . We note that the security of this scheme is similar to the security of the original CP-ABE scheme [23] which is proved secure against chosen-plaintext attacks in the generic model.
5) AN EXAMPLE DATA SHARING SCENARIO
Let us consider health data comprising health history to be shared between a data owner (o i ) and data users (u 1 , u 2 ). As explained in subsection III-B, we assume the health data is perturbed as pd 1 i and pd 2 i under LDP using δ 1 and δ 2 , respectively. Suppose the target data users are doctors working in the cardiology department of hospital HP1. Let us further assume that u 1 is less trusted and is given partial access to the data (i.e., u 1 can only access the pd 1 i perturbed data copy) and u 2 is more trusted and thus granted a full access-right to the health data (i.e., u 2 can access the pd 1 i and pd 2 i perturbed data copies).
Based on the above description, attributes, including a trust-level attribute, are assigned to the data users u 1 and u 2 . The trust-level (TL) attribute can bear multiple values. Hence, for u 1 , the decryption key is associated with the following attribute set: {hospital = HP1, department = cardiology, TL = { 1 }}. 1 , which is the inner set, is the trust-level between the data owner and u 1 . Since, the TL in the above set has only one value, it can be re-written as:
Meanwhile, for u 2 to have full access to the health data, her/his assigned decryption key is associated with the following attribute set: {hospital = HP1, department = cardiology, TL = { 1 , 2 }| 1 < 2 }. Here, the inner set is the compound attribute associated with the trust-level between the data owner and u 2 . In more intuitive manner, the above set can be re-written as: {{hospital = HP1, department = cardiology, TL = 1 }, {hospital = HP1, department = cardiology, TL = 2 }}. Note that, since u 2 is the most trusted user in this scenario, the TL attribute bears value for all the available trust-levels ( 1 , 2 ) .
To share the perturbed data copies, the data owner defines access policies. For the pd 1 i data copy, the following is the defined access policy: (hospital = HP1 AND department = cardiology AND TL = 1 ). Both u 1 and u 2 can satisfy this policy and access the pd 1 i data copy. Meanwhile, access to the pd 2 i data can be regulated using the following access policy: (hospital = HP1 AND department = cardiology AND TL = 2 ). Amongst the two users, the access policy can only be satisfied by u 2 , since she/he has the 2 in her/his attribute set.
Due to the higher trust-level between the data owner and u 2 , u 2 is able to have access to and infer from the two perturbed data copies, pd 1 i and pd 2 i . On the contrary, the trustlevel between the data owner and u 1 is minimal, and thus, u 1 can access only the one perturbed data copy, pd 1 i .
D. EFFECTIVELY INFERRING AGGREGATE STATISTICS
In this subsection, we present an effective method to infer aggregate statistics (addressed in Subsection III-A) based on a collection of shared data which are perturbed by a data owner in an LDP-compliant manner. In this subsection, we extend EM-based estimation in [24] - [26] for our problem scenario. Let us focus on the case of the data user, u h , stated in Subsection III-A. Let us further consider the original data, d i , of the i-th data owner, o i . As described in Subsection III-A, d i is represented as a bit string of length n with exactly one bit set to 1 and others set to 0. Let us assume that v k corresponds to a bit string of length n with the bit in position k set to 1 and others set to 0. Given the i-th data owner's data, d i , the data user, u h , has access to the perturbed copies, pd 1 i , pd 2 i , · · · , pd h i . Then, the probability that these perturbed copies are originated from v k (= d i ) is represented by Bayes' theorem as following:
Here, P(v k ) is the prior probability of observing v k among w data sets,
, o w , which we aim to estimate in this subsection.
The EM algorithm that computes P(v k ) for each k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ n consists of the following steps: 1) A uniform distribution is used to set the initial prior probability P(v k ) (0) as following:
2) In E-step, for each k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the posterior probability,
, is computed by using the current prior probability as following:
.
Here, P(v k ) (t) (where 1 ≤ k ≤ n) represents the current prior probability. The method to compute the conditional probability, P(pd
, will be described in detail later in this subsection.
3) In M-step, the prior probability, P(v k ), for each k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ n is updated as the mean of posterior probabilities which are obtained from a shared data set in the previous E-step:
Note that the updated prior probability is used in the E-step of the next iteration to update posterior probability. 4) The above-mentioned E-step and M-step are repeated until the prior probability, which we aim to estimate in this subsection, is converged. More specially, given the predefined threshold, γ , the EM procedure is terminated if the maximum changes in the prior probabilities are within γ :
| < γ . Now, we present the method to calculate the conditional probability, P(pd
, used to compute the posterior probability in the E-step. This conditional probability denotes the likelihood that h different perturbed data,
, are generated from v k with the RR mechanism by using privacy budgets, δ 1 , δ 2 , · · · , δ h , respectively. Since given privacy budgets, δ 1 , δ 2 , · · · , δ h , the corresponding perturbed data are independently generated from v k , this conditional probability can be rewritten as
Thus, we now need to compute the conditional probability, P(pd c i |v k , δ c ) (where 1 ≤ c ≤ h) that denotes the likelihood that the perturbed data, pd c i , is generated from v k with the RR mechanism by using the privacy budget, δ c .
Given the privacy budget, δ c , let f c be the corresponding value of f used to add randomness in the RR mechanism. VOLUME 7, 2019 Note that f c can be obtained by the equation, c = 2 × ln( 1−0.5f c 0.5f c ), in Subsection II-A. Then, given the privacy budget, δ c , the probability that the q-th bit of pd c i is generated from the q-th bit of v k by the RR mechanism can be computed depending on the values of pd c i and v k as following:
As the RR mechanism is applied to each bit in v k independently, the conditional probability, P(pd y i |v k , δ y ), can be computed as following:
Thus, the conditional probability, P(pd
For ease of explanation, in this section, we assume that the data user, u h , has the same trust level with all data owners, and thus the same privacy protection level of e h is used for all data owners. However, in real application scenarios, a more reasonable assumption is that the data user has a different trust level with each data owner, thus using different privacy protection levels for each of them. We note that the proposed method in this paper can be equally applied to the case where the data user has different trust levels for each data owner. In the experimental section, we present evaluation results for using both same and different privacy protection levels.
Finally, compared with the existing approaches [11] - [13] that are based primarily on ABE, the proposed technique has an additional overhead (i.e., EM-based estimation) caused by using LDP. However, we note that the additional overhead of deriving the aggregate statistics from the perturbed datasets collected under LDP is low as this is an offline process that is triggered when aggregate statistics is required.
IV. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we describe the experiments we carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. First, we systematically generated a synthetic data set and used these data in our initial experimental evaluation. Secondly, we also used a real data set to verify the practicality of our approach.
As stated in Subsection III-A, in the experiment, we explore how effectively data users are able to estimate aggregate statistics, P(v k ) for each k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ n, based on the collection of health data shared under the proposed collaborative eHealth system which supports MPPDS. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we use the average error rate:
Here, P est (v k ) is the estimated value of P(v k ) based on the collection of health data shared under the proposed collaborative eHealth system. In the experiments, given a privacy budget of LDP, we assume three different privacy protection levels,
Note that in this case, the privacy protection level of 1 enforces the strongest privacy protection, while the privacy protection level of 3 provides the weakest privacy protection. We run each experiment 20 times and results reported in the experiment are the averages of all runs.
A. EXPERIMENTS WITH SYNTHETIC DATA
For our experiments, we generated synthetic data sets as follows: By assuming the scenario in which the number of data owners varies from 10K to 100K, we generated three different data sets: 10K, 50K and 100K synthetic bit strings of length 10. Here, the probability of each bit of a bit string being set to 1 follows a normal distribution. Figure 3 shows the average error rate for varying data sizes. In this experiment, we used two different privacy budgets, = 1.5 and = 3.0, of LDP. Furthermore, given , two different cases of privacy protection levels are used, such as uniform increase case (i.e., 1 : 2 : 3 = 1 : 2 : 3) and non-uniform increase case (i.e., 1 : 2 : 3 = 2 : 5 : 10) of privacy levels. As shown in the figure, for all privacy protection levels, the error rate decreases as the data size increases. More importantly, the weaker the privacy protection level is, the lower the error rate. This implies that the more trusted the data users are, the more accurate aggregate statistics they can obtain. This is because under our proposed MPPDS scheme, more trusted data users can access less noisy (perturbed) copies of the true data than less trusted data users. Furthermore, the gaps between the error rates of privacy protection levels, 1 and 3 , of the nonuniform increase case are larger than those between 1 and 3 of the uniform increase case. The reason for this is that the gap between two privacy protection levels, 1 and 3 , of the non-uniform increase case is larger than that between 1 and 3 , of the uniform increase case. These results verify that the proposed collaborative eHealth system well supports MPPDS. Figure 4 shows the average error rate for varying privacy budgets. In this experiment, the privacy budget varies from 1.5 to 6, while the data size is fixed to 100K. As expected, the average error rate decreases, as increases. This is because as the privacy budget increases, noises from the data owner side decrease, which results in increased estimation accuracy at the data user side. As the privacy protection level gets weaker from 1 to 3 , the error rates decrease, which implies that more trusted data users can obtain more accurate aggregate statistics under the proposed collaborative eHealth system. Regarding a comparison between the uniform-and the non-uniform increase cases of privacy protection levels, we observed similar results with those in Figure 3 .
To further investigate the effects of the privacy protection level on the estimation accuracy, we plot the actual and the estimated probabilities, P(v k ) for each k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ 10, in Figure 5 . In this experiment, a data size is set to 50K, the privacy budget, , is set to 1.5, and non-uniform increase case of privacy protection levels, 1 : 2 : 3 = 2 : 5 : 10, is used. As the privacy protection level gets weaker from 1 to 3 , the estimated probabilities (orange plot in the figure) obtained by the proposed approach become similar to the actual probabilities (blue plot in the figure), which indicates that with the proposed MPPDS scheme, more trusted data users are able to obtain more accurate aggregate statistics than less trusted data users, while preserving the privacy of data owners. Figure 6 shows the average error rate for the scenario in which different privacy protection levels are used for shared data sets. In this experiment, we consider the case, 1 = X %, 3 = (100 − X )%, which denotes that among all data shared by data owners, X % data is shared under the privacy protection level of 1 , while (100 − X )% is shared under the privacy protection level of 3 . In the experiment, the data size is fixed to 100K, while the privacy budget varies from 1.5 to 6 and a uniform increase case of privacy protection levels is used. As shown in the figure, as the amount of data shared under a strong privacy protection level (i.e., 1 ) increases, the average error rate increases, which demonstrates that the proposed MPPDS well supports the data sharing scenario where different privacy protection levels are used for a shared data set.
B. EXPERIMENTS WITH REAL DATA
To evaluate our proposed approach with real data sets, we used the NPS dataset from the Health Insurance Review and Assessment (HIRA) service in Korea [27] . This data consists of electronic health records of 3% of the Korean people sampled in 2011. For our experiment, we collected 20K, 100K, and 200K data sets from the HIRA data set as follows: first, we extracted patients who have stayed for two days or more as hospital in-patients and then converted the number of hospital days for these patients to a bit string of length 20, such that the first bit corresponds to the length of stay for hospital being two, and the last bit represents the length of stay for hospital being equal to or more than 21. Figure 7 compares the estimated probabilities, P(v k ) for each k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ 20, with the actual ones. In this experiment, two different privacy budgets, = 0.75 and = 3.0, of LDP are used. Furthermore, given , a uniform increase case, 1 : 2 : 3 = 1 : 2 : 3, is used and the data FIGURE 5. Actual vs. estimated probabilities, P(v k ) (where 1 ≤ k ≤ 10), for varying privacy protection levels: Here, 1 enforces the strongest privacy protection, while 3 provides the weakest privacy protection. VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 6. Average error rate for the scenario in which different privacy protection levels are used for shared data set.
size is fixed to 20K. As shown in the figure, as the privacy protection level gets weaker from 1 to 3 , the estimated probabilities get closer to the actual ones, which demonstrates that the proposed MPPDS scheme enables more trusted data users to compute more accurate aggregate statistics than less trusted data users. Figure 7 also shows that as increases from 0.75 to 3.0, the estimated probabilities get closer to the actual ones. This is because the increase in the privacy budget reduces noise added to the original data of a data owner, providing a weaker privacy protection.
Finally, Figure 8 shows the average error rate for varying (a) data size and (b) privacy budgets. Key observations based on Figure 8 can be summarized as follows: In Figure 8-(a) , the data size varies from 20K to 200K, while the privacy budget is fixed to 1.5. As expected, the average error rate decreases as the data size increases. In Figure 8 -(b), the privacy budget, , varies from 1.5 fixed to 6, while the data size is set to 100K. Once again, as the privacy budget decreases, which enforces a stronger privacy guarantee, the average error rate increases. For all data sizes and privacy budgets, as the level of privacy protection gets weaker from 1 to 3 , the average error rate decreases, which denotes that more trusted data users are able to obtain more accurate aggregate statistics than less trusted data users. These results are consistent with the ones observed by the experiments with synthetic data sets in the previous subsection.
V. RELATED WORK
Recently, LDP has begun to attract attention as a promising way of guaranteeing individual privacy in the process of data collection. RAPPOR, which is one of the most representative data collection mechanisms based on LDP, was implemented in Google Chrome to collect user data, including their default homepage [22] . Fanti et al. introduced a algorithm to estimate the joint distribution between unknown variables by extending RAPPOR [24] . Apple has also leveraged LDP to collect user data, including new words, emojis, deeplinks, and lookup hints inside notes [28] . Recently, the differential privacy team in Apple introduced details of LDP deployment, which enabled the collection of large scale user data, including emojis, health data, and media playback preferences [29] . Ding et al. presented new LDP mechanisms for the repeated collection of counter data, which has been deloyed with Microsoft Windows Insiders [30] . LDP can be used for diverse application domains to collect user data while preserving privacy. [31] - [33] proposed a method for estimating heavy hitters over set-valued data. The proposed method in [32] consists of two phases: a candidate set selection phase that uses a portion of the privacy budget, and a refining phase that selects heavy hitters from the candidate set by leveraging the remaining privacy budget. In [33] , LDP protocols to find out heavy hitters in a large domain was presented, where user are divided into groups, and each group reports a prefix of her value. [34] proposed the optimized local hashing protocol that can provide better accuracy than RAPPOR. Harmony, an advanced data analytics tool, based on LDP, supports the collection and analysis of user data in Samsung smartphones [35] . Kim et al. presented a method to estimate the density of a specific location in an indoor space by leveraging LDP [26] . [36] introduced a new technique for LDP to collect and track evolving local data, making it possible to maintain up-to-date statistics over time. In [37] , the method for releasing low-order (2-way and 3-way) marginal statistic on population under LDP was developed.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE), which has attracted considerable attention in the provision of data access control in the cloud recently, was first proposed in the form of fuzzy identity-based encryption [3] . It was later categorized as a key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [2] and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [4] in subsequent studies. Henceforth, several improvements have been made on ABE for its effective usage in cloud environments. Li et al. proposed a CP-ABE scheme based on an ordered binary decision diagram (OBDD) as an access structure [9] . Their scheme has improved the expressiveness and achieved better performance in terms of computation time and storage capacity. To solve the problem of ciphertexts growing linearly with the increase in the number of attributes, CP-ABE schemes that produce ciphertexts with a constant size were proposed by [7] , [38] . In [6] , [39] , outsourced decryption is suggested to reduce the computation demand on users. Susilo et al. [40] and Wang et al. [41] proposed schemes that allow for delegations while maintaining data integrity. The scheme in [40] improves collaboration by permitting a legible user to extend the access structure to allow for originally ineligible users to access data. [42] proposed an integrated access tree for designing an access control for cloud-based data. The scheme divides the data into units and each unit has its own access structure. The individual unit access structures are then combined hierarchically into a tree to form an integrated access structure for the whole data. This improves the performance as same attributes share the same secret during encryption. Recently, Li et al. in [43] , [44] proposed ABE schemes that are resilient against side channel attacks, i.e., their schemes prevent an attacker from learning master keys and user secret keys from the properties of ABE implementation. [45] , [46] proposed ABE revocation schemes that allow for attributes and users to be flexibly added and revoked from the system. Multi-authority ABE schemes, i.e., ABE schemes with multiple attribute authorities, are proposed in [47] - [50] .
From the perspective of health application, Zhang et al. proposed a large universe ABE scheme with policy-hiding for privacy provision in smart health systems [51] . To prevent unnecessary computations during decryption, a decryption test functionality is added in their scheme, i.e., decryption proceeds only after successfully passing the decryption test. Qian et al. proposed a multi-authority ABE scheme for the security of personal health records in the cloud [11] . Their scheme additionally achieves immediate attribute and user revocations, and access policy modification. In [12] , an approach for achieving efficient key management by dividing users into groups was suggested. Furthermore, a multiauthority ABE scheme with immediate attribute revocation and access policy modification was proposed. This scheme is also equipped with a temporary access grant functionality for emergency situations. In [13] , Rao proposed a scheme that leverages ABE and attribute-based signature (ABS) [52] for security provision during health record sharing in the cloud. On top of fine-grained access control, confidentiality, and authenticity, this scheme achieves signer privacy and produces publicly verifiable signatures. An additional use of ABE for the secure exchange of health data in cloud computing environments was proposed in [8] . This scheme relies on a proxy to perform the verification of requesting user credentials before they are availed with the data.
Health systems that are designed to collect the data of patients from a variety of sources, process and store them systematically, and permit their access through queries, contribute significantly to the success of collaborative health. Owing to the large volume, velocity, and variety of the collected data, the design of health systems for collaborative health relies primarily on big data platforms for storage and processing. Lijun et al. [53] proposed a health system, Medoop, for the efficient storage and exchange of health information. Their system relies on the Hadoop platform and fully utilizes its scalability aspects, high reliability, and high throughput to achieve its goals. Yang and Liu [54] proposed an architecture based on cross-enterprise document sharing for the integration of patient profiles and exchange of clinical information among different computing systems. Their system utilizes the parallel computing power of Hadoop to enhance computation power and system scalability, thus rendering it suitable for the faster processing and exchange of personal health records among healthcare stakeholders. Wan and Sankaranarayanan [55] suggested a cloud-based electronic medical record (EMR) system that allows different health stakeholders (including mobile stakeholders) to access cloud-based EMRs. In [56] , Kaur and Chana proposed a cloud-based intelligent healthcare service for the real-time monitoring of user health for illnesses such as diabetes. Their system utilizes sensors to gather relevant data from the user and cloud computing to analyze and predict the data.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a novel collaborative eHealth system, which supports multilevel privacy-preserving data sharing (MPPDS). Our proposed approach leverages LDP to preserve the privacy of data owners in the process of data sharing and relies on ABE to support multilevel privacy guarantee mechanisms depending on the degree of trust between data owners and data users. We also presented a method to effectively estimate aggregate statistics based on the collection of health data shared by different data owners under different levels of privacy protections. Experimental results show that the proposed MPPDS scheme enables more trusted data users to compute more accurate aggregate statistics than less trusted data users in a collaborative eHealth system. Future work will include extensions of the proposed system presented in this paper to various types of health data other than a bit string data type. 
